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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

:
:

BERT JAMES DURRANT,

Case No.
14478

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann- §
76-5-207 (1953), as amended, in the Fourth District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of the crime
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-207 (1953), as amended, before the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen, Judge, presiding.

Appellant was thereafter

sentenced to a term of five years probation and to serve
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thirty days in the Utah County Jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower
court's decision finding appellant guilty of automobile
homicide.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of April 17, 1975,
the appellant with three other persons riding in his vehicle
collided with a parked construction earthmoving vehicle in the
area of 695 East 700 North, American Fork, Utah (R.47-54,
Exhibits).

As a result, Mrs. Cindy Edwards was killed in

the collision (R.40-41).

Appellant was then taken to

American Fork Hospital where he was admitted and given
emergency treatment (R.51-52).

At this time, appellant was

receiving medical treatment from a registered nurse, Dr.
Murdock, a licensed physician, and Mr. Linebaugh, a
technologist specializing in blood analysis at the American
Fork Hospital (T.4,27).

At the request of Dr. Murdock and

under his direction and supervision, Mr. Linebaugh, an
experienced technician of seventeen years, withdrew blood
from the appellant in accordance with standard medical
practice (T.4,27).

Mr. Linebaugh testified that although

he was authorized to withdraw blood from appellant, no one
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actually stood over his shoulder and watched his every
move (R.74-75).
The lower court found that the State had provided
appellant with a "duly authorized technician"in compliance
with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (f) (1953), as amended.
The appellant was taken to American Fork Hospital and
thereby placed in a very sanitary environment.

In the

presence of a registered nurse and a licensed physician,
Mr. Linebaugh was requested and directed to withdraw
blood from appellant (T.4,27).

The trial court found

that under the facts of this case, the State provided a
"duly authorized technician."

On appellate review, the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah must view the findings
of the trial court in a favorable light consistent with
those findings.
Secondly, appellant claims that it was error
for the lower court not to instruct the jury to "criminal
negligence."

The law in Utah has always been that "simple

negligence" is sufficient for the offense of automobile
homicide; therefore, the lower court was correct in
refusing to instruct upon an element which is totally
inapplicable to the charged offense.
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Respondent respectfully submits that in the
instant case, the State provided a "duly authorized
technician" and that the trial court was correct in
denying appellant's requested instruction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (f)
(1953), AS AMENDED, THE STATE PROVIDED A "DULY
AUTHORIZED" LABORATORY TECHNICIAN TO WITHDRAW BLOOD
FROM APPELLANT UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
A LICENSED PHYSICIAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD
MEDICAL PRACTICE.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (f) (1953), as
amended, sets forth the standard to be followed to
withdraw blood for chemical testing from those
suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.
The statute provides:
" (f) Only a physician,
registered nurse, practical nurse
or duly authorized laboratory
technician, acting at the request
of a police officer can withdraw
blood for the purpose of determining
the alcoholic or drug content therein.
This limitation shall not apply to
the taking of a urine or breath
specimen. Any physician, registered
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nurse, practical nurse or duly
authorized laboratory technician
who, at the direction of a peace
officer, draws a sample of blood
from any person whom the peace
officer has reason to believe is
driving in violation of this
chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which such sample is
drawn, shall be immune from any
civil or criminal liability arising
therefrom, provided such test is
administered according to standard
medical practice."
In the instant case, the State provided a "duly
authorized medical laboratory technician" within the
language of the statute to withdraw blood from the
appellant in accordance with standard medical practice.
Blood was withdrawn from the appellant by Mr.
Linebaugh (T.4).

Mr. Linebaugh is a medical technologist

at the American Fork Hospital and has specialized at the
hospital in blood analysis and drawing blood for ten
years (T.4,27).

Mr. Linebaugh has a total of seventeen

years experience in drawing and analyzing blood and has a
bachelor's degree in Chemistry, a minor in Bacteriology, and
is registered with the American Society of Clinical Pathology (T.27).

Mr. Linebaugh is responsible for the blood

analysis of half of all the patients at the American Fork
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Hospital and through his career has withdrawn blood from
thousands of patients (T.27,28).
In the instant case, appellant was taken to
American Fork Hospital and was thereby placed in a totally
sanitary environment.

Present at this time were Mr.

Linebaugh, the medical technologist, a superivising
registered nurse, and a licensed physician, Dr. Dale
Murdock (T.4).

At the request of Dr. Murdock, as well

as the request from the police officer, Mr. Linebaugh
withdrew blood from the appellant in accordance with
standard medical practice at the American Fork Hospital
(T.4).

It is clear from the facts of this case

that

Mr. Linebaugh was acting under the direction and supervision of Dr. Murdock, a licensed physician, and a
registered nurse, when he withdrew blood from appellant,
thereby establishing sufficient compliance with the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-4410(f) (1953), as
amended.
In a recent Utah Supreme Court case, Gibbs v.
Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (1975), this Court defined the meaning
of "duly authorized laboratory technician." This Court
held:
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"Within the context of Section
41-6-44.10 (f) the term 'duly authorized
laboratory technician1 means an individual acting under the direction and
supervision of a licensed physician.
Such a person must 'administer the
test . . . according to standard
medical practice.1 There is no evidence
in the record showing Mr. Davis to be
such a person."
In the Gibbs case, appellant was to have his blood withdrawn
by a technician, not under the supervision of a licensed
physician and not in accordance with standard medical
practice because appellant was in the unsanitary environment of the Salt Lake City and County Jail (unsanitary
for medical purposes).

There was no evidence in the Gibbs

case showing the technician to be a "duly authorized
laboratory technician."
However, in the instant case, Mr. Linebaugh, the
medical technologist, was in the presence of several
registered nurses, and Dr. Dale Murdock,a licensed physician,
who requested the blood tests (T.4).

Mr. Linebaugh clearly

withdrew blood from the appellant in the sanitary environment of American Fork Hospital under the direction and
supervision of Dr. Murdock and several superivising
registered nurses (T.4).

-7-
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Contrary to appellant's position, it is
respondent's position that the phrase "acting under
the direction and supervision of a licensed physician"
as expounded in the Gibbs case, does not mean the
physician must stand by the side of the technician
and hold his hand as he withdraws blood from appellants.
In State v. Mari, Sup. Ct. Colo., 528 P.2d 917
(1974), defendant was convicted of driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The defendant

contended that under the Colorado statute, the medical
technologist was not qualified to withdraw blood for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein.
The Colorado statute states:
"The test shall be administered
at the direction of the arresting officer
if he has reasonable grounds to believe
such person was driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, and in accordance with rules and
regulations prescribed by the state board
of public health, and with utmost respect
for the constitutional rights, dignity
of person, and health of the person being
tested. The arresting officer may not
take a blood sample, and no person except
a physician, registered nurse, or a
person whose normal duties include withdrawing blood samples under the supervision of a physician or registered nurse
shall be entitled to withdraw blood for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content therein." 1967 Perm. Supp.,
CRS, 13-5-30(3)(b).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the Mari case, the technician was under
the direction and supervision of a doctor, but the
doctor was not present at the time the blood was
withdrawn and defendant claimed this as error.
The Court stated:
"The defendant, on the
other hand, asserts that because
Mrs. Lambert was not, at the
moment she withdrew defendant's
blood, acting under the supervision of a doctor or registered
nurse, she did not come within
the class of persons qualified
by the statute to withdraw
blood. We do not read the
statute to require on-the-spot
supervision; on the contrary, if
her normal duties as a medical
technologist include withdrawing blood samples while she
is under the supervision of
a physician or registered nurse,
she qualifies notwithstanding
the fact that supervision was
not present at this time. We
read the 'under supervision'
clause as referring to any
'normal duties' and not as a
requirement that the supervision be present at the
time the technician withdraws
the blood."
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In State v. Stover, Or. App., 513 P.2d
537 (1973) , a case which was later reversed on other
grounds, defendant was convicted of negligent homicide.
Defendant claimed that the blood sample used in the
test in question was not obtained in compliance with
ORE 4 83.640, which provides:
"In conducting a chemical
test of the blood, only a duly
licensed physician or a person
acting under his direction
or control may withdraw blood
or pierce human tissues."
The Court held that:
"When blood samples are
taken, ORS 483.640 minimizes
the impact of that procedure
on the driver in question, and
maximizes the chances that procedures will be used that do not
contaminate the blood sample in
a way as to affect a subsequent
test of it for alcohol content.
: Given these probable legislative
purposes, we conclude the requirement that blood be withdrawn by Ba person acting under
* * * [the] direction or control1 of a licensed physician
means only that blood be withdrawn in a medically accepted
manner by someone who is
ordinarily supervised by
physicians; the statute does,
not literally mean that a
physician must be physically
present when the blood is withdrawn . "
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The purpose of Section 41-6-44.10(f), Utah
Code Ann. (1953), as amended, is obvious; to protect
citizens from the dangers inherent in incursions into
a person by one not duly authorized in accordance
with standard medical practice.
As this court stated in Gibbs v. Dorius,
supra, at 301:
"There are situations, in
this area of law enforcement,
when blood tests would not only
be appropriate but may be necessary,
as the only means of securing
analysis. Such situations, almost
invariably occur when a lawfully
supervised, sanitary condition
exists."
Respondent respectfully submits that in the
instant case a lawfully supervised, sanitary condition
did exist.

The appellant in the instant case was

taken to a hospital and had his blood withdrawn by
an experienced medical technologist who was under
the direction and supervision of a licensed physician
in accordance with standard medical practice,

thereby

constituting a "duly authorized technician" in compliance
with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-4410(f)r (1953), as amended.
Respondent respectfully submits that the
trial court had sufficient evidence to find Mr. Linebaugh
to be a "duly authorized laboratory technician" and that
evidence must be viewed with an eye favorable to those
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findings including all fair inferences which can be
drawn from the evidence and the circumstances.
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d, 183, 185, 515 P.2d
442 (1973).
POINT II
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-207 REQUIRES ONLY SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE IN A
PERSON'S DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL, IF AS A RESULT HE CAUSES THE DEATH OF
ANOTHER PERSON.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended,
provides the following:
11

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes automobile homicide if
the actor, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
a controlled substance, or any
drug, to a degree which renders the
actor incapable of safely driving
a vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle
in a negligent manner.
(2) The presumption established
by section 41-6-44 (b) of the Utah
Motor Vehicle Act, relating to
blood alcohol percentages, shall
be applicable to this section and
any chemical test administered on
a defendant with his consent or
after his arrest under this section,
whether with or against his consent, shall be admissible in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
(3) For purposes of the automobile homicide section, a motor
vehicle constitutes any self-
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propelled vehicle and includes, but
is not limited to, any automobile,
truck, van, motorcycle, train,
engine, watercraft, or aircraft,
(4) Automobile homicide is a
felony of the third degree."
The automobile homicide statute clearly
speaks in terms of simple negligent operation of a
motor vehicle which results in the death of another,
not "criminal negligence," therefore,the trial court
was correct in refusing to instruct the jury upon an
element which is totally inapplicable to the crime
charged.

Respondent submits that the legislation

must be read in the light of its clear language
and import.

Therefore, the trial court was correct

in instructing the jury concerning the degree of
negligence necessary for the offense of automobile
homicide•
It has always been the rule in Utah that
automobile homicide is an offense requiring simple
negligence when the driver is under the influence
of alcohol which results in the death of another.
In State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019
(1961), defendant was convicted of automobile homicide.
This Court held that:

the crime of automobile homicide

required only simple negligence and went on to state
that:
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"It seems evident that our
legislature has concluded that the
time has now come when we must
recognize that any kind of
vehicular negligence, mingled with
gas and booze, produces a lethal
mixture that, if it cause death
should penalize to a greater
degree than before, the mobile,
tipsy vehicle-operating brewmaster, in order to bring to a
screeching halt the mounting
holocaust daily dedicated to
traffic fatalities."
In

State v. Risk,

•

Utah 2d

, 520 P.2d 215

(1974), defendant was convicted of automobile homicide
and this court again held that the offense of automobile
homicide may be made out by simple negligence in a
personfs driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor if as a result thereof he causes
the death of another person.
Appellant maintains that the trial court
should have instructed the jury in terms of "criminal
negligence".

However, it is obvious from the clear

language of the automobile homicide statute, and from
well established principles of law in the State of
Utah that criminal negligence is not an element of
the offense of automobile homicide.

Therefore,

appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having
a fair trial because the trial court refused to give
i

-14-
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an instruction to a totally erroneous element of
the offense of automobile homicide.

Respondent

respectfully submits that the lower court was correct
in refusing to instruct the jury on "criminal negligence" as an element in the crime of automobile
homicide under the facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that under
the facts of this case the State of Utah provided
appellant with a "duly authorized" technician, as
found by the lower court and that "simple negligence"
not "criminal negligence" is sufficient for the offense
of automobile homicide.

Respondent respectfully sub-

mits that the lower court decision be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
. Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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